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CRIMINAL LAW—SEARCH AND SEIZURES: DETERMINING 
WHEN AN INDIVIDUAL MAY HAVE A REASONABLE 
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN A SHARED RESIDENCE 
State v. Taylor, 2015 ND 100, 862 N.W.2d 801 
ABSTRACT 
 
In State v. Taylor, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that law 
enforcement did not need a second, additional, search warrant to search a 
bedroom of a shared residence.  Taylor alleged that, in addition to a warrant 
to search the shared residence, police officers needed a separate warrant in 
order to lawfully search his personal bedroom.  The district court agreed 
and suppressed the evidence found from the search of his bedroom.  On 
appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed; it reversed and 
remanded the district court’s suppression.  In finding a valid search of the 
defendant’s bedroom, the North Dakota Supreme Court altered the analysis 
of what constitutes a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the state of 
North Dakota.  In so doing, the court elaborates to which circumstances a 
person may reasonably have an expectation of privacy. 
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I. FACTS 
A law enforcement officer, with the Grand Forks Narcotics Task Force, 
applied and obtained a search warrant to search a residence.1 The residence 
was a single family home and located in Grand Forks, North Dakota.2  To 
support the warrant, the officer provided in his affidavit that he “received 
information from a University of North Dakota college student that Nathe 
and unknown counterparts” were affiliated with a drug trafficking 
organization in the Grand Forks area.3  Nathe and counterparts were 
reported to be distributing “marijuana, psilocybin mushrooms, LSD, 
ecstasy, MDMA, DMT, and other types of research chemicals.”4  The Task 
Force also conducted a garbage pull at Nathe’s residence.5  During the pull, 
the Task Force found a paystub containing Nathe’s information and items 
such as a “small zip lock baggie, two screens, and two large plastic bags,” 
 
1. State v. Taylor, 2015 ND 100, ¶ 2, 862 N.W.2d 801, 803.  
2. Id.  
3. Id.  
4. Id. 
5. Id.  
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which contained marijuana residue.6 Based on this information, the 
magistrate issued a search warrant.7 
The search warrant provided: 
You are hereby commanded to conduct this search of the residence 
of 1817 1st Ave North in Grand Forks, and that such search shall 
be for the purposes of looking for and seizing all controlled 
substances, drug paraphernalia, and any funds derived from the 
sale of controlled substances, fruits of the crime and cellphones 
utilized in the initiation and conduction of illegal activities.8 
The Task Force executed the search warrant on October 24, 2013.9  
The residence subject to the search was a single family home, containing 
common living areas, such as a kitchen and living room, and four separate 
bedrooms.10  Two of these bedrooms were Nathe’s and Taylor’s, with the 
bedrooms being located on the main level and basement level, 
respectfully.11  Four individuals resided at the residence, three of which 
were present during the Task Force’s search.12  During its execution, the 
Task Force found marijuana and drug paraphernalia in both the common 
areas of the residences, as well as the individual bedrooms, including 
Taylor’s bedroom.13  The Task Force executed the search pursuant to the 
warrant; at no time did Taylor grant the Task Force permission to search his 
bedroom.14 
Taylor was arrested at the residence15 and subsequently charged with 
possession of more than one ounce of marijuana and possession of drug 
paraphernalia.16  Taylor moved to suppress the evidence found in his 
private bedroom arguing law enforcement had violated his Fourth 
Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures.17  Taylor 
argued that since he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his private 
bedroom, law enforcement required a separate warrant to search his 
bedroom.18 
 
6. Id.  
7. Id.  
8. Id.  
9. Id.  
10. Id. ¶ 4. 
11. Id. 
12. Id.  
13. Id. ¶ 2. 
14. Id.  
15. Id.  
16. Id. ¶ 3. 
17. Id.  
18. Id.  
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The district court granted Taylor’s motion and held that law 
enforcement needed to obtain a subsequent warrant for Taylor’s bedroom 
because Taylor had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his private 
room.19  On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and 
remanded.20 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees 
that all people have the right to be secure against unreasonable search and 
seizure.  The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.21 
The Fourth Amendment applies to the States through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.22  Additionally, North Dakota has 
adopted nearly identical language in its state constitution.23 
A. A HISTORY OF “REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY” IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND NORTH DAKOTA 
Central to the Supreme Court of the United States’ Fourth Amendment 
determinations is whether an individual had a “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” in the area being searched.24  In Katz, the United States Supreme 
Court further explained that a reasonable expectation of privacy attaches to 
the individual, not places or things.25  Because of this, if a person 
knowingly exposes something to the public, it is not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment; but the Fourth Amendment may attach when an individual 
seeks to preserve his privacy.26  Using this reasoning, the Supreme Court 
 
19. Id. ¶ 5, 862 N.W.2d at 804. 
20. Id. ¶ 21, 862 N.W.2d at 809.  
21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) 
23. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized.”). 
24. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449-50 (1989). 
25. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
26. Id. 
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has determined that going through garbage,27 flying airplanes and 
helicopters over houses,28 and subpoenaing bank records29 does not violate 
an individual’s right against unreasonable search and seizure. 
As the cases above indicate, the Supreme Court relies heavily upon the 
facts of each case in its effort of fleshing out the meaning of “reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”  Justice Harlan, in his concurrence in Katz, was the 
first to outline the two-prong test for reasonable expectation of privacy. 
“First, that a person [has] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”30  The Supreme Court would later formally 
adopt Justice Harlan’s two-prong test for its analysis of “reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”31 
Similar to federal law, North Dakota requires two elements when 
proving a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy: (1) the individual 
must have an actual, subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) that 
expectation must be one that society recognizes as reasonable.32  North 
Dakota cases have laid out several factors which contribute to the court’s 
determination of whether there is a legitimate expectation of privacy.  
Those factors include “[w]hether the party has a possessory interest in the 
things seized or the place searched; whether the party can exclude others 
from that place; whether the party took precautions to maintain the privacy; 
and whether the party had a key to the premises.”33 
B. THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN A HOME IN 
NORTH DAKOTA 
Both the United States Supreme Court and North Dakota have 
consistently held that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in one’s home.34  The Supreme Court has labeled the government’s entry 
 
27. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988). 
28. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989) (helicopter); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 
207, 213-14 (1986) (airplane). 
29. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976). 
30. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
31. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (Justice Rehnquist wrote: “legitimation 
of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by 
reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and 
permitted by society.”); see generally United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2014) cert. 
denied 135 S. Ct. 1448 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2015) (No. 14-7818); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 
(2013). 
32. State v. Nguyen, 2013 ND 252, ¶ 8, 841 N.W.2d 676, 680. 
33. Id. ¶ 9 (quoting United Sates v. Mendoza, 281 F.3d 712, 715 (8th Cir. 2002)). 
34. Compare Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414 (“At the [Fourth] Amendment’s ‘very core’ stands 
‘the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental 
intrusion.’” (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961))) with State v. Kochel, 
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into someone’s home the “chief evil” of which the Fourth Amendment is 
tasked to protect.35  And as such, a warrantless search or seizure within a 
home is presumptively unreasonable.36 
Although one’s home is unchallenged as a place in which an individual 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy, what is considered part of the 
“home” is constantly changing and evolving.  There is little doubt that 
anything beyond the home’s front door is protected by the Fourth 
Amendment; but what about the front stoop, the garage, or backyard?  Do 
these areas require the same protection as the kitchen and bedrooms located 
inside the home?  The answer to this question, and most legal questions, is 
“it depends.” 
The area surrounding the structure of a home is considered the home’s 
curtilage.  North Dakota defines the home’s curtilage as the “area near a 
dwelling, not necessarily enclosed, that generally includes buildings or 
other adjuncts used for domestic purposes.”37  North Dakota has adopted 
the factors outlined in United States v. Dunn,38 to aid in its determination of 
curtilage.39  The factors are: (1) “the proximity of the home to the area 
claimed to be curtilage,” (2) “whether the area is within an enclosure 
surrounding the home,” (3) “the nature of the uses to which the area is put,” 
and (4) “the steps taken to protect the area from observation by individuals 
passing by.”40 
The courts do not apply these factors mechanically; they are merely 
analytical tools used to determine whether the area is so intimately tied to 
the home that it should be afforded the same protection under the Fourth 
Amendment.41  Most often, areas such as attached garages42 and enclosed 
porches43 are considered protected areas requiring a warrant before law 
enforcement’s entry.  In these areas, people keep personal items, hold 
private conversations, and most importantly, have a right to exclude others. 
However, some areas do not fall firmly into either category of curtilage 
or non-curtilage, such as the hallways in apartment complexes.  These areas 
are often used to store personal items, such as shoes, bikes, and crafts signs, 
 
2008 ND 28, ¶ 7, 744 N.W.2d 771, 773 (“[W]arrantless searches and seizures inside a home are 
presumptively unreasonable.” (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Kitchen, 1997 ND 241, ¶ 
13, 572 N.W.2d 106, 109)). 
35. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).  
36. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 584 (1980); see also Kochel, ¶ 7, 744 N.W.2d at 773. 
37. State v. Mittleider, 2011 ND 242, ¶ 15, 809 N.W.2d 303, 307 (quotation mark omitted).  
38. 480 U.S. 294 (1987). 
39. State v. Williams, 2015 ND 103, ¶¶ 9-10, 862 N.W.2d 831, 833-34. 
40. Id. ¶ 9, 862 N.W.2d at 834. 
41. Id.  
42. State v. Blumler, 458 N.W.2d 300, 300 (N.D. 1990). 
43. State v. Kochel, 2008 ND 28, ¶ 7, 744 N.W.2d 771, 773. 
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and in most situations a person can only gain access if they have a key or 
are “buzzed” in by a resident.  Even though these characteristics point 
towards the hallway being curtilage, courts have consistently held that 
tenants of multifamily dwellings do not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in these common or shared areas.44  The courts have reached this 
conclusion because, although secured with locks, the locks are present to 
provide security, not secrecy or privacy.45  To have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in an area, it is implied that a person “will be free of 
any intrusion, not merely unwarranted intrusions.”46  Thus, the courts’ 
analyses depend upon an individual’s ability to bar others from the area. 
III. COURT’S ANALYSIS 
As discussed above, because a person has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their home, law enforcement officers are required to obtain a 
warrant before passing the threshold of the front door.  However, this 
Fourth Amendment protection is not extended to common areas within a 
multi-family residence, such as an apartment building.47  But what about 
residences that cannot be categorized as a private dwelling or an apartment, 
such as an individual living in a single-family home with non-relation 
roommates?  Does that individual have his own independent protection of 
the Fourth Amendment for his private bedroom or is the protection solely 
for the residence as a whole?  The North Dakota Supreme Court attempts to 
answer this question in State v. Taylor. 
In Taylor, the defendant argued that a separate search warrant was 
required for law enforcement to search his own private bedroom in a shared 
residence.48  Law enforcement had already applied for, and was granted, a 
search warrant to search the entire residence; but Taylor argued that he had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his bedroom, separate from the rest 
 
44. See United States v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554, 558 (1st Cir. 1976) (holding the 
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in parking garage of condominium); 
United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1252-53 (3rd Cir. 1992) (holding the defendant did not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in hallway of apartment building); United States v. 
Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding the defendant had no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in common area of apartment building); United States v. McCaster, 193 
F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding the defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in a 
duplex hallway’s closet).  Currently, the Sixth Circuit is the only circuit that recognizes a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of a locked apartment building.  See United 
States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545, 554 (6th Cir. 1976). 
45. United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 1977). 
46. Id.  
47. United States v. McCaster, 193 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 1999). 
48. State v. Taylor, 2015 ND 100, ¶ 3, 862 N.W.2d 801, 803. 
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of the common living areas of the house.49  This issue of whether a separate 
search warrant is required to search the private bedroom of a shared 
residence was an area of first impression for the North Dakota Supreme 
Court.50 
The court started its analysis by discussing the scope of search warrants 
in general, noting that a search warrant is typically restricted to the places 
described in the warrant.51  However, the court acknowledged that “a search 
warrant may extend to the entire area covered by the warrant’s 
description.”52  This means that law enforcement can search the garage 
attached to a residence described in a warrant or look inside the closets and 
drawers inside of a home.53  The burden lay with Taylor to show that law 
enforcement incorrectly relied on the face of the warrant or that the scope of 
the warrant was impermissibly extended when officers entered his 
bedroom.54  The scope of the search warrant is impermissibly expanded 
when the area being searched has a separate “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” other than the general area covered in the search warrant.55 
A. THE COURT’S ANALYSIS OF STATE V. DRISCOLL 
The court looked towards State v. Driscoll to aid in its analysis.56  In 
Driscoll, law enforcement executed a search warrant on a residence with the 
intent of discovering evidence of cocaine trafficking.57  While executing the 
warrant, the police searched inside the defendant’s purse.58  Inside the 
purse, law enforcement found, among other things, methamphetamine and a 
large quantity of cash.59  Driscoll attempted to have the evidence 
suppressed on two grounds: (1) her purse, because she was a visitor, was 
outside the scope of the warrant; and (2) she had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in her purse requiring law enforcement to obtain a second search 
warrant before searching its contents.60 
 
49. Id.  
50. Id. ¶ 11, 862 N.W.2d at 805. 
51. Id. ¶ 9, 862 N.W.2d at 804 (citing State v. Bollingberg, 2004 ND 30, ¶ 14, 674 N.W.2d 
281, 284). 
52. Id. at 804-05 (quoting State v. Erickson, 496 N.W.2d 555, 560) (N.D. 1993)). 
53. See State v. Driscoll, 2005 ND 105, ¶ 17, 697 N.W.2d 351, 358.  
54. Taylor, ¶ 11, 862 N.W.2d at 805.  
55. Id. ¶ 15, 862 N.W.2d at 807. 
56. Id. ¶¶ 12-13, 862 N.W.2d at 806-07. 
57. Driscoll, ¶¶ 2-3, 697 N.W.2d at 353-54. 
58. Id. ¶ 3, 697 N.W.2d at 354.  
59. Id.  
60. Id. ¶¶ 11, 21, 697 N.W.2d at 356, 359.  
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The court did not agree.61  It found that Driscoll was not a visitor to the 
residence because she had been staying six nights out of the week at the 
residence.62  The court also found that when law enforcement was applying 
for the warrant, they “had no knowledge of exactly who was responsible for 
the drug activity.”63  The court reasoned that “it was not necessary that the 
search warrant particularize exactly where the drug evidence would be 
found in the apartment”64 and that officers “were permitted to search the 
purse, or any other item that could reasonably house the objects of the 
search.”65  Thus, the Driscoll court upheld the search and seizure of the 
defendant’s purse.66 
The court paralleled the facts in Driscoll and the facts present in 
Taylor.67  The court specifically looked at the fact that the officers in 
Driscoll were unable to identify every person of interest in their application 
for the search warrant.68  The only names present in Taylor’s search warrant 
were Nathe along with “unknown counterparts.”69  After completing a 
garbage pull, officers were able to verify a nexus between the residence to 
be searched and criminal activity.70  This allowed the officers to obtain a 
search warrant for the residence, not a specific person.71  The court 
reasoned that because Taylor’s bedroom was part of the residence and, like 
Driscoll’s purse, could have reasonably contained the items being searched 
for, law enforcement’s search was within the scope of the warrant.72  The 
court further clarified that if Taylor had had a greater expectation of privacy 
in his bedroom, apart from the residence as a whole, then the search would 
have been beyond the warrant’s scope.73 
 
61. Id. ¶ 21, 697 N.W.2d at 359.  
62. Id. ¶ 20, 697 N.W.2d at 358-59. 
63. Id. ¶ 14, 697 N.W.2d at 357. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. ¶ 18, 697 N.W.2d at 358.   
Viewing these facts as a whole, it was not only reasonable for police to believe the 
purse could contain evidence of narcotics activity, but it was also reasonable for police 
to view Driscoll, and her property, as being intimately involved with the apartment 
unit and the drug activity apparently occurring there.   
Id. ¶ 20, 697 N.W.2d at 359. 
66.  Id. ¶ 21  
67. State v. Taylor, 2015 ND 100, ¶ 13, 862 N.W.2d 801, 806. 
68. Id.  
69. Id. ¶ 2, 862 N.W.2d at 803. 
70. Id. ¶ 13, 862 N.W.2d at 806. 
71. Id. ¶ 2, 862 N.W.2d at 803. 
72. Id. ¶ 13, 862 N.W.2d at 806. 
73. Id. at 806-07. 
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Whether a person has “a reasonable expectation of privacy in a given 
area must be decided on a case-by-case basis.”74  Because of this, the 
court’s analysis is extremely fact specific.  To determine the level of 
privacy Taylor expected in his bedroom, the court relied on State v. Gatlin 
to outline the elements and factors of whether an individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.75  Gatlin states: 
A reasonable expectation of privacy has two elements: 1) the 
individual must exhibit an actual, subjective expectation of 
privacy, and 2) that expectation must be one that society 
recognizes as reasonable. 
Several factors that contribute to determining whether a legitimate 
expectation of privacy exists include: Whether the party has a 
possessory interest in the things seized or the place searched; 
whether the party can exclude others from that place; whether the 
party took precautions to maintain the privacy; and whether the 
party had a key to the premises.76 
In its analysis of whether Taylor had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his bedroom, the court took a close look at the facts.77  It noted 
that Taylor no doubt had a possessory interest in the items seized and the 
place searched;78 but the court also indicated that the record was silent on 
whether Taylor had the ability to exclude others from his bedroom or 
whether he had his own key to the room.79  There also was no indication 
that Taylor took any steps to keep his room private; officers were able to 
look into the bedroom and see what appeared to be marijuana.80  Because 
there was little, if not nothing, in the record which pointed towards Taylor 
trying to keep his bedroom secure and independent from the rest of the 
house, the court found that he did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his bedroom.81  Thus, the court held that because (1) Taylor’s 
bedroom was part of the “residence” as a whole and (2) Taylor did not have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his bedroom, separate from the rest 
of the residence, law enforcement did not exceed the scope of the search 
 
74. Id. ¶ 11, 862 N.W.2d at 805. 
75. Id. ¶ 14, 862 N.W.2d at 807. 
76. Id. (quoting State v. Gatlin, 2014 ND 162, ¶ 5, 861 N.W.2d 178, 181)   
77. Id. ¶ 15.  
78. Id.  The personal items located in Taylor’s bedroom included checks, a passport, and a 
title to a vehicle.  Id. ¶ 2, 862 N.W.2d at 803. 
79. Id. ¶ 15, 862 N.W.2d at 807.  
80. Id.  
81. Id. 
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warrant.82  All of this being said, in its holding, the court was quick to 
reiterate that whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy is decided 
on a case-by-case basis.83 
B. DISTINGUISHING TAYLOR FROM UNITED STATES V. GREATHOUSE 
AND UNITED STATES V. DAVIS. 
The defendant points to the holdings in United States v. Greathouse 
and United States v. Davis in his argument as to why law enforcement 
unconstitutionally expanded the scope of the search warrant.84  In 
Greathouse, the court found that the defendant had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his personal bedroom in a shared house.85  The court used two 
factors in making this determination: (1) whether steps were taken by the 
individual to preserve the area as private, and (2) whether that individual’s 
expectation of privacy was reasonable.86  In applying these two factors, the 
court looked at three pertinent facts.  First, that the defendant’s bedroom 
door was closed and had a sign posted on the outside reading “Do Not 
Enter.”87  Second, although the door did not have a separate doorbell or 
number, the defendant testified that he was the only one who had access to 
the room.88  And third, officers were immediately told that the defendant 
was renting the room, and it was apparent to the officers that the residents 
were not related.89 
The court in Taylor did not adopt the reasoning of the Greathouse 
court, but did point out that even if it were to apply Greathouse’s reasoning 
to Taylor’s facts, the result would be the same: the search would be 
upheld.90  There simply were no facts present in Taylor’s record to indicate 
that he had taken steps to preserve his privacy interest in his bedroom.91 
Taylor subsequently relied on Davis92 to support his argument that the 
warrant was limited to the areas under Nathe’s control because he was the 
 
82. See id.  
83. Id.  
84. Id. ¶¶ 16-19, 862 N.W.2d at 807-08. 
85. United States v. Greathouse, 297 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1274-75 (D. Or. 2003). 
86. Id. at 1273-74. 
87. Id. at 1274.  
88. Id.  
89. Id.  
90. State v. Taylor, 2015 ND 100, ¶ 17, 862 N.W.2d 801, 807-08. 
91. Id. ¶ 15, 862 N.W.2d at 807. 
92. United States v. Davis, 557 F.2d 1239 (1977).  In Davis, law enforcement officers, while 
executing a search warrant, discovered that there were two separate apartments which did not 
appear to be part of the main residence.  Id. at 1247-48.  The court held that the warrant applied to 
all areas where “officers have reason to believe” are under the control of the defendant.  See id. at 
1248.  
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focus of the investigation.93  The court did not agree.94  Although it is true 
that the search warrant named “Nathe and unknown counterparts,”95 the 
Fourth Amendment does not require search warrants to name the people 
who own or occupy the described premises.96  Because of this, the court 
reiterates that under Driscoll, a lawful search of the premises “extends to 
the entire area in which the object of the search may be found.”97  Thus, the 
court held that Taylor did not meet his burden of showing that the search 
warrant for the residence was impermissibly expanded to include his private 
bedroom.98 
IV. IMPACT AND EFFECTS OF APPLICATION 
Whether or not a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
or her private bedroom is determined on a case-by-case basis.99  And as 
such, the facts presented at a suppression hearing or trial are of upmost 
importance; the court cannot read facts into the record that simply are not 
there.  But what does this mean for the practice of law in North Dakota? 
Why should it matter whether a bedroom door has its own lock or a sign 
reading “Do Not Disturb”?  The importance lies with the increasing 
prevalence of non-familial living.  Twenty years ago, protecting one’s 
privacy from roommates typically only involved college students.  But now, 
with the presence of the oil boom and the housing shortage being felt across 
the entire state, more and more adults are opting to cohabitate with each 
other.100 
This increase in cohabitation leads to two separate questions: (1) How 
can law enforcement properly execute a warrant without impermissibly 
expanding the scope into areas which individuals have reasonable 
expectations of privacy? and (2) How can individuals sharing a living space 
protect themselves from the search warrants of their roommates? 
 
93. Taylor, ¶ 18, 862 N.W.2d at 808. 
94. Id. ¶ 19. 
95. Id. ¶ 2, 862 N.W.2d at 803. 
96. Id. ¶ 19, 862 N.W.2d at 808 
97. Id. (quoting State v. Driscoll, 2005 ND 105, ¶ 16, 697 N.W.2d 351, 358). 
98. Id. ¶ 20, 862 N.W.2d at 809.  
99. Id. ¶ 11, 862 N.W.2d at 805 (citing State v. Kitchen, 1997 ND 241, ¶ 12, 572 N.W.2d 
106, 109). 
100. Tessa Berenson, Oil Is the New Gold: Inside North Dakota’s Oil Rush, TIME (June 24, 
2014), http://time.com/2911836/oil-north-dakota/.  Williston’s population has doubled since 2010. 
Id.  “[T]he steady stream of hopeful workers into the small town means that, even with high 
wages, many are stuck living [in] temporary housing facilities sprouting up in the Bakken oil 
region while they wait for more permanent housing to be built.”  Id.  In Mountrail County, one-
third of the population is living in temporary housing.  A.G. Sulzberger, Oil Rigs Bring Camps of 
Men to the Prairie, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2011), http://www nytimes.com/2011/11/26/us/north-
dakota-oil-boom-creates-camps-of-men html?_r=0.  
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A. SETTING LAW ENFORCEMENT UP FOR SUCCESS 
There are certain situations in which law enforcement should be on the 
lookout for when executing a search warrant on what they believe to be a 
single-family residence.  Some red flags for law enforcement would be if 
each bedroom has an individual lock on the outside, if the bedrooms are 
separately numbered, or if there are private entrances to each room.  It is 
important to note that just because a person has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his or her separate bedroom, it does not mean that officers cannot 
search the bedroom; it means that law enforcement must secure the room 
and apply for another search warrant, similar to as they would if they seized 
a person’s computer. 
But just as there are facts which would support a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, there too are facts which would point towards its 
defeat.  Open bedroom doors are one of these facts.  It would be 
exceedingly difficult to prove that the owner of the bedroom had a right to 
exclude others from the room and took precautions to maintain his privacy 
if the bedroom’s door was wide open.101  In the end, it comes down to 
officers being aware: aware of the rising rate of co-habitation, aware of the 
facts that may point towards a residence housing multiple individuals, and 
most importantly, aware of when they should take a step back during the 
execution of a search warrant and apply for a subsequent warrant. 
B. SETTING ROOMMATES UP FOR SUCCESS. 
Residing with roommates may be the only option for some individuals, 
either because of the cost of living alone or due to the shortage of available 
housing.  But sharing a house with others should not mean that an 
individual’s room should be subject to a search warrant based on his or her 
roommate’s possibly criminal activities.  To protect oneself from such a 
search, there are a number of preventative steps that an individual can take. 
Some of the easiest and most effective steps include making it known to 
your roommates that only you are allowed into the room without prior 
approval, placing a lock on the door and possessing the only key, and 
keeping the door closed and locked when you are away. 
But taking such steps is not enough; if law enforcement completes an 
unreasonable search, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, it is imperative 
that the facts outlining the defendant’s efforts in maintaining privacy be put 
into the record.  Courts cannot assume any fact.  It is the defendant’s burden 
 
101. See Taylor, ¶ 15, 862 N.W.2d at 807 (noting that the door to Taylor’s bedroom was not 
closed). 
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to prove that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his room, an 
expectation of privacy above and beyond the privacy in the residence as a 
whole.  Defendants can prove their burden by simply following the above 
steps. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In State v. Taylor, the Supreme Court of North Dakota overturned the 
district court’s finding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his personal bedroom of a shared residence.102  In determining 
that Taylor did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his bedroom, 
the court looked to whether Taylor (1) had a possessory interest in his 
bedroom, (2) could exclude others, (3) took precautions to maintain his 
privacy, and (4) had a key to the premises.103  Although the court ultimately 
concluded that Taylor did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his room, separate from the residence, the court stated that such an interest 
must be determined on a case-by-case basis.104  As such, the court did not 
reject the idea that an individual may have a separate, reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his bedroom, but instead provides that an 
individual must take certain steps to establish such an expectation.105 
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